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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces size-adjusted growth models of network security
attacks. The primary aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that rapid growth
of network attack incidents is at least partly explainable by the exponential
increase in network size. The growth of network security attacks is modeled from
information obtained after looking into: (i) imitation and deterrence processes
involved in an attack, and (ii) how network externalities such as size influence
the growth process. The non-linear models are estimated by using data from
network security attacks obtained during the course of 10 years. We first show
that network size is strongly correlated with various types of attack incidents,
thus lending proof that size is an important factor in most network security
attacks. Next, the results obtained from the diffusion models show that when both
imitation and deterrence activities are taken into account and size effect is also
added to a growth model, the attacks can be modeled more realistically. The
targeted audience of this paper are IS researchers and professionals with interest
in IS security.

INTRODUCTION
The number of security attacks is
growing rapidly. In the first three quarters of
2002, the number of reported global security
incidents rose to 73,359, which far surpassed

the total 52,658 reported incidents in 2001.
Recently, a deadly worm named Blaster hit at
least 330,000 machines around the world and
caused damage to the tune of more than $320
million as of August 2003 (Messmer 2003).
Nodes or stations on the Internet and websites
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are regularly attacked and the number of
break-ins or attempted break-ins is steadily on
the rise. Internet attack types include denial of
service (DOS), worm and virus, domain name
system (DNS) attack, router attacks, and web
defacement (Denning 2000). The 2002
CSI/FBI report discusses many other types of
computer- and Internet-based attacks or
misuses such as financial and telecom fraud,
telecom eavesdropping, sabotage, laptop
misuse, active wiretap, and insider abuse of
net access to name a few (Power 2002). The
combined effect of all these attacks is
devastating at times. One needs to find out
how the attacks are growing and what factors
are fueling such rapid attack growth.
One of the important contributors to the
growth of such attacks is the size of the
network. The growth of the Internet/the Web is
phenomenal. Internet traffic, which was
growing at a rate of 100% per year in the U.S.,
was expected to overtake telephone traffic in
the U.S. by the end of 2003 (Coffman and
Odlyzko 1998). Rai, Ravichandran, and
Samaddar (1997) observed that the growth of

the Internet is exponential in nature and that
traditional contagion models fail to explain the
growth.
Although network size can be an
important factor in attack growths, this fact
needs to be empirically tested. This article
addresses the growth of security attacks with
the help of exponential size-adjusted nonlinear diffusion models. To test the hypothesis,
we use the data on Internet security attacks
from CERT/CC and the network size data
from the World Bank. Our results show the
impact of network size on the number of
security attacks.
We use the growth theory, security
theory, and network externality theory in this
study. Standard growth or diffusion theory can
explain the growth of a technology or a
phenomenon of interest (Mahajan and
Peterson 1987). Traditional logistic and
Gompertz models (depending on different
assumptions of the nature of growth) can
explain how a product or a phenomenon is
diffused over time, based on the word-ofmouth propagation. Traditional diffusion

CONTRIBUTIONS
Since the inception of the Internet, security attack incidents have increased rapidly.
These attacks have caused enormous financial damage to industry, government, and society in
general. For example, the reported annual losses due to attacks in the year 2003 amounted to
$201,797,340 (Richardson 2003). Network exponential size effect is considered in the diffusion
models of the Internet attack incidents that lead to a better prediction of the number of network
attack incidents. We test the hypothesis using Internet attack incident data from Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC 2001) and using a measure of
Internet size represented by the number of Internet users per 1,000 people, obtained from the
World Bank.
Additionally, by modeling the attack incident growths as a combination of attacks and
deterrence schemes, the modeling framework as adopted in the paper encompasses a more
realistic picture of attack growths (Bagchi and Udo 2003).
The study provides preliminary empirical evidence that network size matters in
predicting Internet attack incident growth. Diffusion models designed by incorporating size can
better predict the attack incident growth. There is a strong correlation between Internet size and
various attack incident numbers.
Security is an important topic in information systems management and recently research
interests have been focused on this topic (Brancheau, Janz, and Wetherbe 1996), (Householder,
Houle and Daughtery 2002), (Micksch 2000), (Watson, Kelly, Galliers and Brancheau 1997).
This research should be of interest to researchers who deal with the economic impact of Internet
attacks. This research is also expected to be of moderate interest to all Information Systems (IS)
researchers, practitioners, policy makers and managers who have to deal with the everincreasing Internet security concern. Practitioners can also benefit from this research by noting
the added impact that size has on the growth of Internet attacks.
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models are used to model mostly good
innovations;
a
change
in
modeling
assumptions is needed to model the attack
incident growth because such a growth
depends on imitative behaviors as well as
preventive mechanisms employed over time as
noted by some scholars (Pitcher, Hamblin and
Miller 1978), (Straub 1990), (Straub and
Welke 1998). We also use network externality
theory in our model. Network externality has
been defined as a change in the benefit, or
surplus, that an agent derives from a good
when the number of other agents consuming
the same kind of good changes (Farrell and
Saloner, 1985). Take the example of the
Internet. Users of the Internet can interact with
other users. Thus, an increase in Internet size
can create more values for the Internet. That
may explain why more Internet attacks are
taking place. These theories together can better
explain the attack growth incidents, as will be
shown in this article.
The paper consists of seven sections.
Section 2 provides background on network
externality theory. In section 3 we explain the
growth or diffusion theories and proposed
models. Section 4 discusses the impact of
different externalities. Section 5 deals with the
data used, presents the results of regressions,
and explores. Section 6 provides a summary of
results, and section 7 (conclusions) presents
the interpretation of results and suggestions for
further research.

THE NETWORK EXTERNALITY
THEORY AND THE ROLE OF SIZE
The Network Externality theory (Arthur
1989), (David 1985), (Farrell and Saloner
1985), (Katz and Shapiro 1986), (Varian 2001),
(Windrum and Swann 1999) states that the
value of a network depends on, among other
things, the number of its nodes (i.e., size of the
network), assuming full connectivity. Other
researchers of network externality theory
emphasize the relationship between the value
of a network and the network content
(Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan, and Smith 2002).
Negative network externalities are also
considered in research. For example, in an EDI
context, positive externalities for buyers are
generated when more suppliers join in;
however, this also generates negative
externalities for the suppliers (Wang and

Seidmann 1995).
This paper deals with
positive network externality in the form of
network size as it is incorporated in diffusion
models.
One problem is determining the
functional relationship between the size of a
network and the network’s value. Three
assumptions on these relationships exist
(Gottinger 2000): linear, logarithmic, and
exponential.
•

Linear: as networks grow, the marginal
value of new nodes is constant.

•

Logarithmic: as networks grow, the
marginal value of new nodes diminishes,
network externalities at the limit are
inconsequential, zero, or negative in
comparison to quantifying effects on
prices. Katz and Shapiro (1986) observed
that network externalities are positive but
diminish in value and at the limit are zero.

•

Exponential: as networks grow, the
marginal value of new nodes increases.
An example of this is the Metcalfe’s law
(Metcalfe 1995). Metcalfe’s law states
that the value of a network is proportional
to the square of the number of its users.

One can also combine these three
assumptions in some fashion. Thus, a
combination of Metcalfe’s law and logarithmic
assumption can lead to an S-curve-like
function (Rogers 2003). The assumption is that
while early growth is exponential, later
additions diminish in their marginal value.
Another combination possibility could be that
in later stages of adoption, the size contributes
in an exponential manner. Thus, instead of
growth diminishing as per an S-curve, the
growth continues unabated. This is the
argument made in this paper as network
security attacks are studied.
The value of the Internet to attackers is
an important aspect in generation of such
attacks. With the increase in number of attacks,
the value of the Internet to the attackers also
increases. Future attackers find the system
more and more attractive to fashion an attack.
Since anyone who can break a system gets
“recognition” from other intruders, attackers
usually have responded to this added value.
Internet attacks generate universal and quick
attention. Therefore, attackers devise newer
ways to deface Web sites, introduce newer and
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more destructive versions of viruses/worms,
and generate distributed denial of service
attacks. The question is: As the Internet grows
in size, will the value in such attacks also grow,
resulting in an exponential growth in attacks?
An answer is attempted via the help of a few
new models designed for this study. A few
size-based extensions to pure diffusion models
are introduced. We first consider a security
attack model with S-curve-like features that
assumes that the growth will reach a maximum
limit at a certain point and then will decline.
Extensions of this S-curve model with an
exponential, linear and logarithmic parts are
next considered, which assume that the attacks
will show an exponential, linear or logarithmic
growth in later stages as the size of the
network continues to grow.

A COMBINED GROWTH THEORY AND
SECURITY THEORY FRAMEWORK
Rogers
(2003)
notes
that
diffusion/growth theory studies are growing at
the rate of 120 diffusion studies a year, and
that no other behavioral science research is so
extensive and well-grounded in theory. The
growth theory assumes that growth curves are
like S-curves, i.e., the natural growth rate
starts slowly, gradually increases until it
reaches an equilibrium level (called an
inflection point), and then tapers off. Growth
can also be induced by technological changes
as the quality of the product improves and
continuously raises the equilibrium level.
Growth models can combine these two growth
types.
One of the ways to incorporate the
effect of technological changes in the natural
growth process of a product is to assume that
the equilibrium level of the growth curve is a
function of price given quality (Gurbaxani and
Mendelson 1990). However, for modeling
network attack incidents, a better approach
could be to assume that technological changes
are increasing the size of the network. Thus
the effect of size could be included in the
natural growth model.
Finally, prior research has shown that
growth of many innovations at least in the
initial stages is more like an exponential one
(Rogers 2003). One can similarly argue that
attack incidents have also grown exponentially.
Thus an exponential part can be added to a
120

diffusion model to see if the growth of attack
incidents follows such a model.
Growth analysis in terms of imitation and
deterrence processes
Traditional growth models fail to
analyze the security attack phenomenon
adequately, as these are based on either a
supply-demand rationale or on a learning
perspective, or they use a technological
substitution or use a communication theory
based frame of reference (Mahajan and
Peterson 1987). None of these frameworks is
adequate for modeling security attack incident
growth. Several other network security models
exist. Operational models of network attack
detection exist. Denning (1987) introduced an
intrusion detection model that operated on
audit record trail. Verwoerd and Hunt (2002)
describe many intrusion detection techniques
such as statistical models, neural networks,
state transition analysis etc., for modeling
normal and abnormal behaviors. Moitra and
Konda (2004) examine reported network
incidents over time. They observed that
distribution of inter-attack times is exponential
in nature and that the rate of attacks indicates
an increasing trend. Shimeall and Williams
(2001) describe a framework for conducting
security trend analysis. Trending can be
temporal, spatial, and associational depending
on the situation encountered. A trend
generation process establishes a baseline
pattern for a trend and a detection of a change
in the pattern indicates an abnormal situation.
Instead of modeling attacks as a series of
events, Templeton and Levitt (2000) consider
attacks as a set of capabilities that provide
support for abstract attack concepts. However,
none of these studies describe or analyze
attack incident growth in terms of imitation,
deterrence and network size. Previous research
has recognized the need to consider both
deterrence and imitation of attacks in modeling
the growth of network security attacks (Pitcher,
Hamblin and Miller 1978), (Straub 1990).
Intuitively,
implementing
deterrence
procedures and preventive measures would
result in lower security attacks. This is
partially supported by Straub’s (1990)
empirical study, in which he found that
computer abuse decreases when deterrence
procedures and preventive security software
were used. Increasing security awareness
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through education and training also helps in
reducing network security breaches (Straub
and Welke 1998). Loch and Conger (1996)
found that attitude and social norms are vital
with respect to the intention of engaging in
legal or illegal computing acts. Thus, a
network security model should explicitly
include the influence of deterrence and
preventive procedures (Bagchi and Udo 2003).
Our security attack growth model considers
deterrence as well stimulus (e.g., imitation)
together with size in explaining the growth
process.

criminal intentions such as making money,
taking economic and political advantages, etc.,
have emerged (Power 2002), (Turoff 2004).
We discuss some of these issues below in
more details. All of these issues are probably
related to the size of the Internet—as the
number of Internet users grow, these attacks
types are also expected to grow.

Behavioral aspects of network attacks

•

In July, 2004, a Californian woman was
charged with fraudulently using her
computer to embezzle more than
$875,035 from North Bay Health Care
Group. The victim firm is a not-for-profit
organization which operates hospitals and
clinics in Vacaville and Fairfield,
California.

•

In May 2004, a Pennsylvania man was
sentenced to prison for illegally accessing
a Massachusetts Investor’s On-line
investment account and making $46,000
in unauthorized trades.

•

In November, 2003, three men were
indicted for hacking into Lowe's
Companies' Computers with intent to steal
credit card information. According to
Power (2002), the biggest financial fraud
problem is the theft of large quantities of
credit-card records from ill-protected
servers.

Take for example, the economic
incentives on the net. Some recent cases from
the Department of Justice (US DOJ) illustrate
the rapid rise of this kind of attacks (CCIPS
2004).

Imitative side: hackers and other attackers
One of the primary attack motivations
is sociological: peer reinforcement. Bandura
(1986) observed that people only engage in
harmful attack incidents when they feel
threatened and feel like acting by observing
the successful aggression or attack done by
earlier attackers. Thus every attack incident
can be regarded as an imitation of previous
behavior and a behavioral model for other
attackers to follow. Hackers constitute a large
section of people who creates such attacks.
Hacker psychology varies to a great extent.
According to some hacker experts, sometimes
they just want to imitate or have fun. Many of
them have a teenager-type mentality and they
do it because their friends are doing it, and
they want to achieve something by doing it
(Kopytoff 2003).
Sometimes, hackers may generate these
network attacks to protest against unfair
dominance of the Internet by business. A
“hacker ideology” may have become
fashionable in young Internet users and it is
possible that a significant minority of young
users may view attacks as a legitimate and
productive mode of protest against the
dominance of the Internet by large
corporations. Some experts also agree to this
viewpoint (Kopytoff 2003), (Sinrod and Reilly
2000).
Another explanation of attacks could be
that some of them are generated by young
hackers to gain attention. Traditionally, the
challenge for such attackers has been not
criminal but an intellectual exercise to
penetrate a system (Dreyfus 2002). In recent
times, apart from pure hacking, different

Some firms/nations want to become
information monopolies by destroying
competitors. An example case cited in (Power
2002) will illustrate the point. In July 2001, a
software firm called Avant was ordered to pay
$182 million for stealing source code from
Cadence, a competing firm.
Sometimes intelligence operations are
encouraged by corporations and governments
to gather information on competitors. Here are
some recent cases:
•

The CSI/FBI report of 2003 (Richardson
2003) cites the case of a person who left a
firm named TBC to join a competitor of
the firm in 2001. The man made several
unauthorized accesses to TBC’s computer
systems using his Internet connections to
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gain a commercial advantage resulting in
$21, 636 in damages and costs to TBC.
•

Two Chinese scientists and a U.S. citizen
were charged with stealing the source
code to Lucent Technologies PathStar for
the Chinese firm Datang Telecom (Power
2002).

Geopolitical conflicts also contribute to
attack incidents. The CSI/FBI report of 2002
indicates that a large percentage of web site
defacements were due to geopolitical conflicts
such as those that occurred in the Middle East,
the Indian subcontinent and the Chinese
populated regions. For example, China and
Taiwan domain names constituted about 9% of
all web site defacement incidents. Israel
domain names registered a 220% increase in
defacements. The corresponding % increase in
defacement incidents for India and Pakistan
was 205% and 300% respectively. Domains
such as .mil and .gov registered a 128% and
37% increase in web site defacements during
this period, thus indicating that U.S
government and military web sites were
increasingly under the attack.
From a political point of view, no real
effective international agreements in this area
exist, although some efforts have been made in
the recent past. Forty-one European countries,
plus the U.S., Canada and Japan signed a
treaty that supplies a legal framework aimed at
the protection of society against cyber-crime
(Convention 2001).
Cultural and institutional factors also
come into play. Many poor foreign
governments do not have the necessary work
ethics at place or the infrastructure to prevent
it. Finally, the lack of an adequate technology
to prevent attacks is an important factor to
consider. It is the individual users or firms
who end up paying for the necessary
protection costs which sometimes could be
prohibitive.
We next discuss the deterrence side of
the attacks such as legislative effects and the
increase deployment of sophisticated security
systems.
Deterrence side: legislative effects
Security laws and regulations of a
nation aid the inhibition side of the equation.
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Compliance with law when properly enforced
may inhibit security attacks. The U.S.
government already has some laws and
regulations in place related to computers,
access devices, and communication lines,
stations, and systems. The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Statute of 1986 (USC 1030) states
that anyone who knowingly or intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access is liable to be
punished.
There are several laws that may act as a
deterrent to hacking/cracking activities, as
cogently articulated by Sinrod and Reilly
(2000). These are summarized in Table 1.
The Patriot Act of 2001 made some
relevant changes to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) to make it stricter (Reilly
2002). The new by-laws include better antihacking provisions, a change in determining a
hacker’s intent to cause a specified loss,
implication for computers located outside the
U.S., expansion of civil damages, and
protection of hardware, software, and
firmware firms.
To give an example, this statute makes
it clear that an individual needs only to show
intent to damage the computer or information
on it and no specific dollar amount of loss or
harm is required to convict a offender.
Deterrence side: other defensive acts
Another major deterrence effort has
been in the direction of developing counter
attack tools and frameworks such as anti-virus
software, firewalls, etc. These tools are
improving with the passage of time, making it
increasingly difficult for an attacker to mount
an offensive against the network (Bass 2000),
(Jain, Hong and Pankanti 2000), (Schneier
1999), (Zviran and Haga 1999). However,
with the release of each hardware and software,
vulnerabilities do creep in, and intelligent
attackers always find a way to attack the
system by exploiting the vulnerabilities.
Finally, some researchers (Alles et al. 2004)
discuss the design of an emergencypreparedness system that can proactively deter
many such attacks and can be considered as a
system of the future.
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Table 1. Summary of Internet Attack-related Laws
Statute Name and Number
The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Statute of 1986 (USC 1030)
The USC $1029(a)(7)
18 USC $1343
18 USC $1030(a)(3)
18 USC $1030(a)(2)(c)
18 USC $1030(a)(4)
18 USC $1030(a)(5)
15 USC $1644(b)
18 USC $1029(a)(2) or (3)
18 USC $1030(a)(5)(b)-(c)

Where Applied
Knowingly or intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization or in excess of authorized access
Telecommunication instruments that have been modified or
altered to obtain unauthorized use of telecommunication
services
Prohibits intentional scheming to obtain money or property
by means of false pretenses by wire
Criminalizes intentional access of non-public computers
Criminalizes intentional access of information from a
protected computer
Liable if obtained something of value more than $5,000
Liable if caused damage of value more than $5,000
Liable if credit card number is transferred illegally over the
phone
Liable if used unauthorized access device within a year and
obtained anything of value >$1,000
Criminalizes intentional damage of a computer

Network attack growth models
Thus, imitation and inhibition as
assumed by our proposed model combined
with the size influence could provide a
realistic background in modeling attack
incidents. Two traditional growth models, the
logistic model (S-curve based) and the
exponential model, without the incorporation
of the size impact are presented in Table 2.
Also, the model used by Pitcher, Hamblin and
Miller (1978) (hereafter called the PHM model
in this paper) is used in this study and shown
in Table 2, which assumes that the probable
causes for outbreak of such attack incidents
are imitative as well as inhibitive in nature and
the growth is asymmetric in nature.

Network size-adjusted extended models
First, an extension (based on the size)
of the PHM model is developed. The attack
incident growth curve can be analyzed by
examining the rate of logarithm of cumulative
attack incident data (Gurbaxani and
Mendelson 1990) given by:
DAttckt = dlog(Attckt)/dt

(1)

For the yearly data, the discrete analog
of (1) can be used which is:
DAttckt = log(Attckt)-log(Attckt-1)

(2)

The formulation for DAttckt for the
PHM model is:
DAttckt = log(b)* [log(Attckt)-log(K)]

(3)

where K is the upper bound of growth.
Table 2. Formulation of Different Diffusion Models
Model Type
The Logistic
Model
The Exponential
Model
The PHM Model

Formulation of cumulative growth rate
dAttck(t)/dt = b*Attck(t)*(Attckbar-Attck(t))
Attckbar Æupper limit of cumulative incident attacks
bÆrate of growth
dAttck(t)/dt= g *Attck(t)
g Æ the growth rate constant
dAttck(t)/dt=c*e-q*t Attck(t)
c Æthe net rate of instigation to attacks and
q Æthe rate at which they are inhibited
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Figure 1. The Plot of DAttckt over Time
The formulation for DAttckt for the
logistic model is:

the formulation with various size factors is
shown.

DAttckt = log(b)* [K*(Attckt)-1]

Network externality theory assumes
that the bigger the size of the network, the
higher the value of a product that leads to
more adoptions. The original security attack
incident
model
can
be
represented
mathematically as:

(4)

For the data obtained from CERT/CC,
the plot of DAttckt over time t is shown in
Figure 1.
It appears that DAttckt decreases over
time t for sometime after which it becomes flat
(with noise added). This slow down of DAttckt
may not be completely captured by a pure Scurve. The growth is more like an S-curve
initially and later became exponential in nature.
A single model that can capture this growth
phenomenon should have both elements
represented in the model. What can cause this
exponential-like growth in later years? One of
the factors that may explain such growth is the
network size factor.
It is, therefore, hypothesized that a
growth model incorporating a network size
factor may adequately describe the growth
process of attack incidents. In the following,
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dAttck(t)/dt = c*e-q*t Attck(t)

(5)

This results in Attck(t) as an S-shaped
curve. Now the nature of the growth series
depends not only on the S-shaped curve
Attck(t), but also is a function (g(Intt)) of the
“size of the network” series represented by Intt.
Let us denote the new size-adjusted growth
series as SAttck(t). Then
SAttck(t) =Attck(t)* g(Intt)

(6)

IMPACT OF DIFFERENT
EXTERNALITIES
Network externality in the form of size
may influence the development of all types of
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security breaches. As the Internet grows
exponentially, security breaches may tend to
grow in a similar fashion. As Power and other
experts note, Internet-based attacks are
steadily on the rise (Power 2002). The size of
the
Internet
itself
has
experienced
phenomenon growth in recent years hence, we
state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Most computer crimes and
security breaches will exhibit size-based
network externality phenomena.
We next discuss the various types of
externalities and their influences on network
attacks.
Exponential externality
Let us assume that g(Intt) follows an
exponential distribution (in short exp) as
observed in the attack growth data, i.e.:
g(Intt) = exp(λ*(Intt))

g(Intt) = Log (e+λ*(Intt))

(10a)

and
SAttck(t)= (f* exp(K*Bt ))*log(e+λ*Intt) (10b)
where “e” is the natural logarithmic constant,
approximately 2.71828.
We now formally state hypothesis 2.
Let the null hypothesis be that the attack
incident growth follows an S-curve. Let the
alternative hypothesis be that attack incident
growth follows an S-curve adjusted for
network externality. The hypothesis whether
size-based network externality phenomenon is
significant for attack incident growths is tested
for growth models.
Hypothesis 2. Network size-adjusted
diffusion models will be better than the pure
diffusion models as far as time-varying
modeling of attack incidents is concerned.

(7)

where λ is a constant indicating size-induced
growth.
The functional form is as follows:
SAttck(t)= (f*exp(K* Bt ))*exp (λ*(Intt))
t

Log(SAttck(t))= logf + K*B + (λ*Intt)

(8a)
(8b)

where f=Attck0*exp(c/q), Attck0 is the
cumulative number of attack incidents at time
t=0, c is the net rate of instigations and q is the
rate of inhibition, B=exp(-q).
When λ =0, the equation reduces to a
pure S-curve: SAttck(t) =Attck(t) (which is the
PHM model) and which represents the
diffusion effects only. When λ >0, the growth
would represent an exponential one, reflecting
the effect of network externality phenomenon.
Linear Externality
Let us assume that g(Intt) follows a
linear distribution as observed in the attack
growth data, i.e.:
g(Intt) = (A+ λ*(Intt))

(9a)
t

SAttck(t) = (f* exp(K* B ))*(A+ λ* Intt) (9b)
where λ
and A are constants and not
simultaneously zero.
Logarithmic externality
The formulation of the logarithmic sizeadjusted PHM model can also be done in a
similar fashion.

DATA AND RESULTS
Data on attack incidents are
sparse. Combining data from various sources
also reduces the number of data points (10
years, in the present case). It may be
mentioned that a few data points have been
used in literature to model the diffusion
process of an innovation, especially at an
earlier stage of its growth (Mahajan and
Peterson 1987). We next describe briefly the
different data sets used in this paper.
Attack incident data
An attack is a single unauthorized
access attempt, or unauthorized use attempt,
regardless of success. An incident, on the other
hand, involves a group of attacks that can be
distinguished from other incidents because of
the distinctiveness of attackers, and the degree
of similarity of sites, techniques, and timing.
The CERT/CC data records used in the present
study were of incidents composed of numerous
attacks (Howard 1997). The data set consisting
of cumulative yearly data spans a period of 14
years from 1988 to 2001. Howard (1997)
mentions several problems with the data,
although researchers have used the data in
many situations (Householder, Houle and
Daughtery 2002). For a detailed description of
the data and its use, the reader is referred to
(CERT/CC 2001).
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Attack type data
Attack type data (for testing hypothesis
1) were collected from the survey called
“Annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and
Security Survey” sent to survey information
security practitioners in U.S. organizations
(Power 2002). The survey has been run with
almost the same set of questions from 1987 to
present. The data set from the survey of 2003
is used for the present study. The response rate
for the 2003 survey was less than 20% with
530 practitioners responding. Richardson
(2003) mentions that the statistical rigor of the
CSI/FBI survey findings is sound.
The total annual loss data which is in
U.S. dollar value is used. The annual financial
loss data figures that reflect the most accurate
situation is used in terms of the extent of
financial damages incurred by firms by such
attacks. The financial loss data figures were
converted to 1996 U.S. dollar value by
dividing by the price deflator for each year.
The logarithmic value is used to keep the
errors in check.
Network size data
In order to obtain network size data, the
measurement of the Internet users per 1000
people in the U.S. was adopted from the World
Bank (World Bank 2003). The U.S. data
numbers were used, as 70% of all users and
hosts of the world are from the U.S. and most

attack incidents reported by CERT/CC are
targeted toward the U.S. hosts and sites. Since
we had data encompassing 10 years, our sizeadjusted diffusion model contained 10 data
points.
Results and Analysis
We first tested the hypothesis
(hypothesis 1) that all computer crimes and
security breaches exhibit size-based network
externality phenomena. This hypothesis is
supported in a limited way. As shown within
Table 3, six out of nine types of attacks or
misuses
exhibit
network
externality
phenomena as far as the size of the network is
concerned. In other words, an increase in
Internet network size shows an increase in
attack activity in every two out of three types
of attacks or misuse. This provides limited
support for hypothesis 1.
Three attack types: unauthorized insider
access, telecom fraud or active wiretapping did
not show any relationship to network size.
Active wiretapping and telecommunication
fraud are not common, because these are
inherently difficult to do, compared to other
forms of attacks (Panko 2003). Active
wiretapping is also highly under reported as
even many governments secretly participate in
this activity. Additionally, this type of attack
growth is not directly dependent on the
Internet growth.

Table 3. Correlation Results for Network Size Influence (1997-2000)
FACTORS (Log of)

PEARSON
CORRELATIONS

Internet Users per 1,000 (size)
Attack types
Theft of Proprietary Information
Sabotage of Data of Networks
Telecom Eavesdropping
System of Penetration by Outsider
Insider Abuse of Net Access
Financial Fraud
Denial of Service
Number of Virus
Unauthorized Insider Access
Telecom Fraud
Active Wiretapping
Laptop Theft
• * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
• ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
• NS - not significant
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0.9875
0.9678
0.9960
0.9951
0.9972
0.9832
0.9961
0.9890
0.8547
0.8723
0.9267
0.9804

SIGNIFICANT
(2-TAILED)
0.013*
0.032*
0.004**
0.005**
0.003**
0.017*
0.056*
0.011*
0.145N.S
0.128N.S
0.245N.S
0.02*
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Unauthorized access by insiders
represents a broad section of such attacks. It is
a fairly common and credible form of attack.
IT staff members and security staffs of a firm
often have very wide knowledge and access
permissions (Panko 2003). Additionally, ebusiness has introduced the concept of global
instant access to corporate data. Firms, in
order to support this concept have opted for
infrastructures that are based on open systems
and networks. As a result universal access to a
firm’s infrastructure is extended to customers,
partners, vendors, etc (Palisade 2003). The
threat of attacks emanating from such accesses
is real. A few examples will illustrate the point
(Computer World 2001).
In 1997, a temporary computer
technician at Forbes magazine was charged
with crashing the company’s network and
causing more than $100,000 in damage. In
1998, a disgruntled programmer at Omega
Engineering Corp. set off a digital bomb,
destroying $10 million in data. Disgruntled
employees and other insiders with legitimate
access to critical business networks accounted
for more than 80% of the cyber attacks against
companies in 2000.
However, some of these attacks can be
mounted on the internal network or an
individual machine of the firm, thus making
these independent of the Internet. Additionally,
firms may not like to disclose this type of
attack, for fear of losing customers and
stockholders.
Telecom fraud can be wired or wireless
in nature. According to Gordon and Loeb
(2004), telecom fraud accounted for
$3,997,500 and abuse of wireless network
amounted to $10,159,250 in the year 2004.
Accurate fraud figures are difficult to obtain
and not all such frauds are related to the
Internet infrastructure.
Many of these frauds are aimed at
gaining financial advantages, committed by
insiders and often are not reported. To quote
an expert (Power 2002), “ Most organizations
do not make financial fraud incidents public
because they do not want the bad PR, and they
do not want federal law enforcement getting
involved. It is often perceived as easier for the
companies to take the loss. However, of the

press releases that exist, most
employees, former employees.”

involve

Hypothesis 1 provided preliminary
evidence that size matters in Internet attack
growth. We next focused on growth models.
To observe the impact of the value of λ (which
measures the impact of size) on an
exponential-sized PHM model, a few
simulations were done for various λ values.
The growth curves are plotted against the pure
diffusion curve of the PHM model. It is
observed that as λ is increasing in value (.004
to .01), the growth curves are rapidly
increasing and the overall curve shows an
exponential like pattern. This is shown in
Figure 2.
To answer graphically whether the
growth pattern is closer to the pure logistic
model or the PHM model, a plot of DAttckt
was done on Attckt (Figure 3(a)) and log
(Attckt ) (Figure 3(b)). DAttckt is the growth
rate of logarithm of Attckt or
DAttckt = d(logAttckt )/dt.
We take the discrete analog of DAttckt :
DAttckt = log(Attckt+1)-log(Attckt)
When DAttckt is plotted against Attckt,
DAttckt should resemble a decreasing linear
function of Attckt (as in the case of the logistic
model). However, the fit to a linear decreasing
function is poor (R2 of linear fit=0.14), as
shown in Figure 3(a). As the PHM model
formulation implies, DAttckt when plotted
against log(Attckt) should resemble a
decreasing linear function of log(Attckt).
Indeed it is much closer to a linear decreasing
function (R2of linear fit=0.76) as shown in
Figure 3(b). This analysis shows the better
model fit of the PHM model over the logistic
model. One can expect that size-adjusted
PHM model will also provide better fit than
the corresponding size-adjusted logistic model.
Tables 4-6 include the summary of nonlinear regression results containing estimates
of different models, and Figure 4 shows the
fits obtained from the two best models (the
PHM model and extended PHM model with
exponential network size). The non-linear least
square technique was used to estimate the
parameter values. Earlier results showed that
the PHM model performs better than other
traditional growth models (Bagchi, Solis, and
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Figure 2. λ Values and Their Impact on the Overall Exponential Sized Growth-curves

3.00

2.00

DAttckt

1.00

0.00

10000.00

20000.00

Attckt
Figure 3(a). The plot of DAttckt against Attckt.
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Figure 3(b). The Plot of DAttckt against log(Attckt) (with linear fit)
Udo 2003). The PHM model showed a
reasonably good fit with R2 value of 0.97.
Next, the PHM model was compared to
its extensions based on network size. Results
are shown in Table 4. The model extension
with log (network size) was eliminated from
consideration as simulations showed that the
log’s fit was the worst of all models. Although
the pure PHM model (model 1) provides a
good fit, model 2 (PHM model extended with
an exponential size) shows a better fit (R2
value = 0.99), and the value of λ in model 2 is
statistically different from zero (p<.000).
Therefore, the null hypothesis that λ = 0 can be
rejected for model 2, and it can be concluded
that exponential size assumption has a
significant impact on the growth of attack
incidents. Model 3 (Table 4), which is an
extension of PHM model with a linear network
size, is poor in estimates with the lowest R2
value (0.96). The extended logistic model with
exponential size (model 4) was also considered.
The extended logistic model provides a good
fit (R2 value = 0.99) and again shows that the
size-extended model is a better fit than the
pure logistic model.
So from a model fit point of view, the
best two models are: model 2 (the extended

PHM model with exponential size) and model
4 (the extended logistic model with
exponential size). However, since the extended
logistic model’s explainability is poorer than
the extended PHM model with exponential
size, we select extended exponential sizeadjusted PHM model (model 2) as the best
model for the attack incidents. The fit of
extended PHM model (model 2) was also
better than the extended logistic model (model
4). When measured in terms of sum of
absolute deviations of the estimates from the
actual data, the sum of absolute deviations was
larger for the extended logistic when compared
to the extended PHM model (29,553.13
against 17,557.7). Figure 6 shows the
estimates from the PHM model and an
extension of the PHM model with exponential
size. Table 5 shows a few sample data values
and estimates.
The general pattern of the rate of attack
growth appears to be explained better by the
size-incorporated security model.
This
supports hypothesis 2. The best model (model
2, extended size-adjusted PHM), however, still
underestimates the actual growth somewhat. In
order to empirically test the superiority of the
size-adjusted model over the pure PHM model,
we employed Davidson and Mackinnon’s P-
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates and Model Fits from a Few Selected Models
Model 1. Pure Attack Incident Model (PHM model)
c=.9;
Overall R2

q=.04
97

Model 2. Network size-adjusted PHM model:
log[SAttck(t)]=logf + K* Bt + λ* Intt (network size is exponential)
Parameter
logf
B
K
λ

Estimate
9.47
76
-4.69
.004

c=1.287,
Overall R2

q=0.274
.99

Model 3. Network size-adjusted PHM model:
SAttck(t)=(f* exp(K* Bt ))*(A+ λ* Intt)
(network size is linear)
Parameter
A
logf
B
K
λ
c=.01,

Estimate
0
14.61
99
-10.00
.81
q=.10

Overall R2

.96

Model 4. Network size-adjusted Logistic Model:
[1/SAttck(t)]=(K+C*Bt )*exp(-λ* Intt)
(network size is exponential)
Parameter
C
B
K
λ

Estimate
.023
.4779
.000094
.0028

Overall R2

.99

Table 5. Some Examples of Actual data and Estimates
Cumulative Attack Incident data
390
2903
7655
12362

Year
1990
1993
1995
1997

PHM with Exp. Network-size-included
(Model 2)
362.67
2870.37
6921.25
13569.65

Pure PHM model
(Model 1)
237.6
3262.8
9376.1
19026.56

25955
47711

1999
2000

27318.74
39261.98

30577.22
36420.26
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Figure 4. Estimates from Two Attack Incident Models
test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1981), (Hu,
Saunders and Gebelt 1997). This test can be
used to check whether one non-nested nonlinear model is superior to another such model.
If model 1 can eliminate model 2 (assuming
model 1 as the null model in the test and
model 2 as the alternate model) and model 2
can not eliminate model 1 (assuming model 2
as the null model and model 1 as the alternate
model in the test), then model 1 can be
considered as a superior model.
Two P-tests were done using the PHM
model and the size-adjusted PHM model
respectively as null models. The results of the
test are shown in Table 6. We found that the
size-adjusted PHM model is the true model as
the test shows that the size-adjusted PHM

model could eliminate the PHM model
(insignificant p-value of .148>.001); however,
the converse is false. The reverse test showed
that the size-adjusted PHM model could not be
eliminated by the PHM model (significant pvalue of .000<.001). The tests showed the
superiority of the size-adjusted PHM model
over the pure PHM model, thus partly
supporting hypothesis 2.

SUMMARY
An initial correlation analysis of twelve attack
types showed that an increase in Internet
network size is related to an increase in attack
activity in every two out of three types of
attacks or misuse. Next, several size-adjusted

Table 6. P-test results
Null Model
Alternative Model
PHM
PHM
Size-adj. PHM

N/A
8.14***

Size-adj.
PHM
-1.66NS
N/A

***p< .001; NS-not significant; N/A-not applicable
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growth models were introduced to analyze the
Internet attack phenomenon over time. From a
previous study we observed that an attack
incident model (PHM model) outperformed
other traditional models used in a growth study
(logistic, exponential, etc.) (Bagchi, Solis and
Udo 2003). As mentioned earlier, the PHM
model has two components, the net rate of
instigation, c (0.90), and a rate of inhibition, q
(0.04), in which a combination can reflect the
true process of attacks. The imitation part of
the model captures the rate at which people are
influenced by other attacks; the inhibition part
of the model captures the deterrence strategies
implemented. Deterrence activities inhibit
others from engaging in security attacks. The
results show that the net imitation coefficient
is much stronger than the inhibition coefficient
for the data set. Imitation effects are stronger
as attack incidents often get strong publicity.
Thus Model 1 (PHM model) provided better
fit and explainability than traditional growth
models (logistic and exponential).
Next the PHM model was compared to
several extensions of the PHM model as well
as an extension of the logistic model with
network size incorporated (Table 4). In these
models (models 2-4), the diffusion theory
based growth explained the growth process in
the earlier part. The later part of growth was
explained better by the network externality
theory—network size plays an important role
in the growth of attack incidents. Model 2,
which is an extended version of the PHM
model augmented with an exponential size,
improved upon the original PHM model in
both model fit and explainability of the attack
incidents by including the exponential network
size effect. The model also performed
marginally better than the extended logistic
model with size. The impact of λ (size effect)
as calculated from this model is 0.4% of
growth per year. The values of two other
components of the model, the net rate of
instigation, c, and a rate of inhibition, q, were
1.287 and 0.274 respectively, which shows
that deterrence efforts were still lagging
compared to the overall attack efforts. Model
2’s assumptions were also consistent with the
earlier observations.
Model 3 is a PHM model augmented
with a linear size assumption that exhibited the
poorest fit. Here the values of the rate of
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imitation, c, and the rate of inhibition, q, were
0.1 and .01 respectively. The value of size
coefficient (λ) was .081 or 8.1 % of the growth
per year. Model 4 is an extended logistic
model augmented with an exponential size. It
also provided a better fit than the pure logistic
model, showing again that network externality
matters. The value of the size coefficient (λ)
was .028 or 2.8 % of the growth per year. The
fit from the model (model 4) can be compared
to model 2, although as discussed above model
2 provides a better fit; however, model 2
clearly is richer in providing a better
explainability of the attack phenomena: it
gives us estimates of net instigation rate,
inhibition rate, and impact of the network size.

CONCLUSIONS
The implication of the findings of this
preliminary study is that the number of
incident attacks can be better predicted by
considering an exponential network size effect.
This finding has implications for practitioners.
Since the number of network attacks is
expected to grow as the size grows, firms need
to implement the latest security software to
protect their systems. Note also that unless
better investments in designing error-free
software and applications and in security
technologies are made and unless more firms
embrace security technologies, the attack
incidents may grow in this fashion as the
network size continues to grow exponentially
and deterrence effects are minimal compared
to the overall attack effects (as results from
model 2 and others show). In the CSI/FBI
survey of 2002, for example, only 90% of
respondents said that they were using antivirus software (CSI/FBI 2002). It was also
noted that viruses were the type of attack that
most frequently resulted in financial loss.
Pipkin, Rubin, and Schindler (2002) think that
most firms do not spend enough money to
protect
themselves,
and
many
IT
administrators have little control of their own
networks.
The Internet growth is still strong and
shows no signs of abatement. This study
captures the attack incident growth process in
its early stages and so is based on a limited
data set of 10 years (limited due to availability
of attack incident and size of the network data).
Two points are worth noting. First, the attacks
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are still in an earlier stage of development and
many innovations (including bad ones) exhibit
exponential growth at an earlier stage (Rogers
2003). Our present results show that. Second,
the attack growth depends on, among other
things, security measures taken that are at best
inadequate at the present time as our results
show (the inhibition coefficient value is much
lower). Empirical evidences show that
defensive mechanisms are mostly reactive in
nature. If proper security mechanisms are in
place, the situation might improve and
influence of network size factor may prove to
be less important in the future.
As the Internet grows, perhaps the
growth process will start behaving more like
an S-curve, as a sustained realization of
exponential growth for a long time is difficult.
Metcalfe also observes this in his seminal
article (Metcalfe 1995). It is possible that the
attack incident growth will also exhibit a
similar S-curve pattern.
In this paper we considered network
size as a major factor that influences attack
incidents. We have earlier detailed many
possible factors that are responsible for such
attacks and in future can be investigated in
detail as a research project. Most of these are
expected to be related positively to the size of
the network: the larger the size of the Internet,
the greater is the volume of such attacks.
There could be other additional factors that
may affect network attack incidents. One other
possible factor is the young Internet user
population size that probably is strongly
correlated to the size of the Internet considered
in this paper. According to experts, attackers
have been traditionally young, although the
demographics are changing in recent times
(Pipkin, Rubin, and Schindler 2002). The
modern day young attachers do not even need
thorough knowledge on creating an attack.
Some of them, called script kiddies, possess
only modest skills but use freely available
attack scripts created by experienced hackers.
These easily-available scripts make it easy to
mount random attacks against firms by
millions of script kiddies. Since these people
are young and are under legal age, firms find it
difficult to press serious legal charges and/or
face unwanted publicity (Panko 2003). The
same absence of legal sanctions prevents firms
to pursue virus writers and releasers. Virus
writing is not a crime in many nations and

tracking a virus releaser is not easy. Attack
automation is another trend that increases the
volume of attacks. Mass automation robots can
do billions of dollars of damage in a few hours.
Several other possible factors in the
increase of network attacks are: infrastructure
facility to access the Internet and a drop in
Internet access prices. All of these possible
factors may have a strong correlation to the
size (as a drop in price increases the
accessibility and therefore the Internet use
increase). Future research should investigate
these various factors and their conjectured
empirical relationships with the size of the
Internet. As an example, consider the effect of
income of the population of a nation.
Considering the period from 1991 to 2001,
for example, we found that the number of
attack incidents was strongly correlated to the
U.S. GDP at the purchasing power parity (PPP)
(Pearson’s
correlation
coefficient=0.80,
p<.003). However, since the number of
Internet users is also strongly correlated to the
U.S. GDP PPP for the same period (1991-2000)
(Pearson’s
correlation
coefficient=0.94,
p<.000), the effect of GDP can be partly taken
care of by the size of the network.
Considering the deterrent side of such
attacks, many technological solutions exist that
can reduce the number of such attacks (Panko
2003). Proper access control, training and
enforcement, encryption of messages, use of
anti-virus
software,
downloading
and
implementing the latest software patches for
the software used, use of penetration defensive
tools such as firewalls, IDS etc., can be
applied to reduce such attacks. Security
auditing is required to ensure that planned
protections are working. However, it is
prudent to note that security is a management
issue and not a technological one. At any firm,
a total commitment to security management is
required. Finally, cyber war and cyber terror
are threats that can cause unmitigated damages
in future. National security planning is
required to counter such attacks.
There are several shortcomings of the
work. These are related to the nature of the
data. First, the security attack incidents
reported may not be exhaustive. For example,
the FBI reports that only 17% of actual attack
incidents are reported (Sofaer and Goodman
2000). A more accurate nature of data should
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include a higher percentage. Second, the time
stamps of the incidents in the earlier phases of
reporting in CERT/CC may not be exact
(Howard 1997). However, these have not
deterred researchers from using the same data
source for other studies (CERT/CC 2001),
(Householder, Houle and Daughtery 2002),
(Moitra and Konda 2004), (Shimeall and
Williams 2003).
Implications and future research
The above findings may be useful to
firms. One implication of the study is that the
current increase in attack incidents is not a fad
but rather may have a theoretical basis. Our
findings suggest that an increase in Internet
network size is related to an increase in attack
or misuse incidences, which implies that
organizations with large networks should pay
even greater attention to their network safety.
Government and firms should recognize that
the present spending in attack-preventing
measures should be increased to prevent more
attacks of this kind.
In order to make a detailed and
thorough future investigation on this aspect we
need reliable time series data of various types
of attacks for an extended period of years.

In future, we plan to extend and test
some of these models on various security
attack types. We also plan to do a Delphi on
what can inhibit the trend in attacks in future.
Some of the interesting issues for future
research, subject to data availability, are: what
factors are responsible for such network
attacks, detecting possible smaller waves of
contagion within the large wave of attacks,
detecting any exhaustion effect resulting from
negative impact of such attacks, if any (Myers
1997). Forecasting is an essential component
of any model design (Franses 1998). We have
designed a new model and presented the
model in this paper. However, for reliable
forecasting purposes, we need several years of
additional data. A future work can deal with
the issue of forecasting based on the sizeadjusted model. Finally, as more data become
available, one can reexamine the growth
pattern to see if exponential size-adjusted
growth has changed.
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